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We present algorithmic solutions aimed on post-processing for industrial quantum key distribution
systems with hardware sifting. The main steps of the procedure are error correction, parameter
estimation, and privacy amplification. Authentication of a classical public communication channel
is also considered.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Significant attention to quantum key distribution [1] is
related to the fact of breaking of public-key encryption
algorithms using quantum computing. Security of public-
key exchange schemes can be justified on the basis of the
complexity of several mathematical problems. Neverthe-
less, the Shor’s algorithm [2] allows solving these prob-
lems in a polynomial time. Absence of efficient classi-
cal (non-quantum) algorithms breaking public-key cryp-
tosystems still remains unproved.
In view of possibility to establish a shared private
key with unconditional security between two users (Al-
ice and Bob) via quantum key distribution [1], using of
information-theoretically secure one-time-pad encryption
technique becomes a practical tool. Privacy of quantum
keys is guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics [3].
Quantum key distribution has been realized in experi-
ments [5–9]. Devices for quantum key distribution are
available on the market [10].
On the top of using of single quantum objects (pho-
tons) as information carriers, in quantum key distribu-
tion protocols such as the seminal BB84 protocol [4] clas-
sical communications and post-processing are required
[4]. A key requirement for quantum key distribution is
that classical communications are not distorted. In other
words, an eavesdropper is able to obtain information from
this channel, but cannot to change it. To this end, one
can use authentication schemes. Due to the technologi-
cal limitations of quantum key distribution, keys of Al-
ice and Bob are initially different even in the absence of
eavesdropping. Excluding of this effect can be realized by
using error correction procedures. On the basis of com-
passion of keys after error corrections, one can estimate
the quantum bit error rate (QBER). If QBER exceeds a
critical value, the parties receive warning message about
possible of eavesdropping. In other cases, they use pri-
vacy amplification methods to exclude announced infor-
mation on previous stages from keys.
In this contribution, we report about the joint research
project, which is aimed on a design of an industrial fiber
based quantum key distribution system in Russia in col-
laboration between four teams. The quantum key distri-
bution engine is based on the decoy states BB84 protocol
[11]. We present the developed post-processing proce-
dure for sifted quantum keys (i.e., keys after basis and
intensity reconciliations), which consists of the following
steps: error correction, parameter estimation, and pri-
vacy amplification. Communications over public channel
are authenticated.
In Sec. II, we briefly describe the hardware engine
of our system. In Sec. III, we consider post-processing
algorithms for error correction, parameter estimation,
and privacy amplification. We discuss authentication
of public channel in Sec. IV. The workflow of the post-
processing procedure is presented in Sec. V. We summa-
rize our results in Sec. VI.
II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION SETUP
Our setup for quantum key distribution consist of two
modules on the each side (Alice and Bob). First, control
units, that are connected via the optical fiber and per-
form all operations with photons. Second, conjugation
units, that are connected with the classical public chan-
nel, perform all post-processing, and export final keys to
external applications.
Operation of the control units is based on the “plug
and play” [12] principle of realization of the BB84 proto-
col with decoy states [11]. Control units work as follows.
Bob sends a sequence (“train”) of strong coherent pulses
to Alice. On her side these pulses are (i) reflected by a
Faraday mirror, (ii) phase modulated with four possible
values according to random basis and bit value, (iii) at-
tenuated to the on three intensities (vacuum, signal, or
decoy), and (iv) sent back. The scheme passively com-
pensates slowly varying polarization fluctuations in the
fiber. In the Bob’s control unit, the returned attenuated
pulses are phase modulated with two possible values that
correspond to random choice of basis, and measured by
pair of single photon detectors.
After an each train of pulses, Bob’s conjugation unit
obtains time indices of detected signals and correspond-
ing bit and basis values. These time indices and values
of basis choices are sent to Alice’s conjugation unit via
2classical channel. Alice compares the measurement bases
with preparation bases and sends Bob time indices of sig-
nal bits, which have been measured and prepared in the
same basis. This procedure is know as sifting. The val-
ues of signal qubits that were prepared and measured in
the same basis give so-called sifted keys, that we denote
as KAsift and K
B
sift. We note that Alice’s conjugation unit
also obtains rate of detection events for all three inten-
sities that are used for revealing of photon-number split-
ting attack. However, in this work we restrict ourselves
to post-processing without paying attention to analysis
of decoy states.
We also note that random choices of bit values and
preparation basis in Alice’s control unit and random
choices of measurement bases in Bob’s one are performed
using random number generators. Random number gen-
erators are important and often forgotten ingredient of
quantum key distribution systems [9]. Their development
is a part of the project [13]. Random number generator
is used several times during the protocol: (i) to gener-
ate random photon states, (ii) to generate random in-
formation specifying the verification hash function, and
(iii) to generate random information specifying the hash
function in verification (part of error correction) and the
privacy amplification procedure.
III. ALGORITHMS FOR THE
POST-PROCESSING PROCEDURE
In this section, we consider processing procedures of
two sifted quantum keys KAsift and K
B
sift.
A. Error correction
The error correction algorithm is applied for making
the sifted quantum keys KAsift and K
B
sift to be identical
on the both sides. We employ the following error cor-
rection algorithm with two basic stages. The first is to
use the low-density parity-check (LDPC) syndrome cod-
ing/decoding [14] to correct discrepancies between keys.
The universal polynomial hashing [15] to verify an iden-
tity between keys after previous step is used as the second
stage.
Alice and Bob share a pool of LDPC parity-matrices
with code-rates R from 0.9 up to 0.5 (with step being
equal to 0.05) and the frame size (length of processed
strings) being equal to n = 4096. These matrices are con-
structed with progressive edge-growth algorithm [16] us-
ing polynomial (degree distributions) from Ref. [17]. For
each coding and decoding process parties employ code
with the minimal rate R, which satisfies the following
condition:
1−R
hb(QBERest)
≤ fcrit (1)
where hb is the standard binary entropy function,
QBERest is the estimated level of QBER (see below),
and fcrit = 1.22 is the critical efficiency parameter in
our setup, that is the tolerable ratio between level of dis-
closed information about sifted key and theoretical limit
for successive error correction, which is predicted by the
classical information theory.
To decrease a frame error rate (probability of unsuc-
cessive decoding) in the constraint that the resulting ef-
ficiency is not greater than fcrit, Alice and Bob use the
shortening technique [18]. The number of shortened bits
ns is obtained from the following expression
ns = ⌊n−
m
fcrithb(QBERest)
⌋, (2)
where ⌊x⌋ stands for the maximal integer less than x. Al-
ice and Bob construct N = 256 strings of length n pos-
sessing n−ns bits of their sifted keys KAsift and K
B
sift and
ns shortened bits, whose positions and values come from
synchronised pseudo-random generator. Bob multiplies
the chosen parity-check matrix on the constructed strings
to obtain syndromes that are sent to Alice. For the
LDPC syndrome decoding, Alice applies iterative sum-
product algorithm [18], which uses log-likelihood ratios
for messages between symbol and parity-check nodes of
the corresponding Tanner graph. To avoid costly calcu-
lations, we employ optimization techniques considered in
Ref. [19]. Then Alice removes shortened bits obtaining
corrected key.
If the algorithm of decoding does not converge for par-
ticular block in a specified number of iterations (we use
about 60 iterations in our setup), then this block is con-
sidered as unverified. However, rarely decoding process
converges to a wrong result, i.e., to a incorrect key but
still with proper syndrome. To avoid such situations, the
second step of verification is used for blocks successively
completed decoding.
In our setup, we employ comparison of hash-tags con-
structed with ε-universal polynomial hashing [15]. In
particular, we use modified 50-bit variant of PolyR hash
function that provide collision probability for a N blocks
of n − ns bits on the level of εver < 2 × 10−12. If the
hash tags on the both sides match, then the correspond-
ing blocks are concerned to be identical on the both sides
and are added to verified keys Kver. We note that Kver
is a part of KBsift as all modifications of the key are per-
formed on the Alice’s side.
B. Parameter estimation
The purpose of the parameter estimation procedure is
to determine QBER that is a probability of bit-flipping
in a quantum channel. This problem could be resolved
by comparison of input KAsift and output Kver keys of the
error correction, because as it was noted all changes of
the key were performed exclusively by Alice. The ratio
of corrected bits is averaged over a set of N the error
correction blocks, and for unverified blocks a conservative
3maximal value 1/2 is assumed. If we denote all verified
blocks in the set as V than the estimated QBER reads
QBERest = N
−1
(∑
i∈V
QBERi +
∣∣V∣∣ /2) , (3)
where QBERi is the ratio of bit-flips in ith block and |V|
is number on unverified blocks.
C. Privacy amplification
After these procedures, both sides have identical bit
strings. Nevertheless, Eve may have some amount of in-
formation about them. The privacy amplification proce-
dure is used to reduce this potential information of an
adversary to a negligible quantity. This is achieved by a
contraction of the input bit string into a shorter string.
The output shorter string is a final private key Ksec of
length lsec. Our algorithm of the privacy amplification
firstly checks (according to Ref. [20]) whether it is possi-
ble to distill private key with the given length and secu-
rity parameter εpa (which is set to εpa = 10
−12). Namely,
define the quantity
ν =
√
2(lver + k)(k + 1) ln
1
εpa
lverk2
, (4)
where k in the number of bits used to estimate the QBER.
Then if the inequality
2−
1
5
(lver(1−hb(δ+ν))−r−t−lsec ≤ εpa (5)
is satisfied, then the generation of a private key of length
lsec and security parameter εpa is possible. Here r is the
length of the syndrome in the error correction procedure
and t is the length of the verification hash.
If formula (5) gives the positive answer on the question
about the possibility of key generation with the desired
parameters, then the final private key is computed as a
hash function of the input bit string. The family of hash
functions is required to be 2-universal [20]. The general-
ization to almost universal families of hash functions is
also possible.
A hash function is chosen randomly from the Toeplitz
universal family of hash functions [21]. A matrix
T of dimensionality lsec × lver is a Toeplitz matrix
if Tij = Ti+1,j+1 = sj−i for all i = 1, . . . , lsec −
1 and j = 1, . . . , lver − 1. Thus, to generate a
Toeplitz matrix, we need a random bit string S =
(s1−lsec , s1−lsec+1, . . . , slver−1) of length lver+ lsec−1. The
string S is generated randomly by one side (say, Alice)
and sent to another side (Bob) by public channel. Let us
denote the corresponding Toeplitz matrix as TS . Then
the final private key is computed as Ksec = TSKver (with
multiplication and addition modulo 2).
It is possible to use not a random, but a pseudo-
random bit string, which uses a shorter random seed,
to specify the Toeplitz matrix [21, 22]. In this case,
the family of hash functions is not universal, but almost
universal, which is also acceptable for privacy amplifi-
cation with some modifications in formula (5). The se-
curity of privacy amplification is based on the Leftover
hash lemma, which can be proved for almost universal
hash functions as well [23]. However, neither the rate of
random number generator, nor the amount of publicly
amount information are critical parameters of our setup.
Thus, we adopt the standard family of Topelitz functions.
IV. AUTHENTICATION
The purpose of the authentication is to ensure that
messages received by each side via public channel were
sent by the other legitimate side (not by the adversary)
and were not changed during the transmission.
Usual way to deal with this problem is hashing of the
messages by hash functions dependent on a private key
Kaut known only to legitimate parties. In general, the
procedure is as follows: Alice sends to Bob a message
with the hash tag. After receiving the message, Bob also
computes the hash tag of the message and compare it
to that received from Alice. If the hash tags coincide,
Bob acknowledge the message as sent by Alice, otherwise
he breaks the protocol. The hash function requires to
assure that, whenever an eavesdropper does not know
the private key, he cannot modify the message of send
his own message and guess the correct hash tag of the
message except for negligible probability (we require it
not to exceed εaut = 10
−12).
For unconditional security, the hash function must be
chosen from some universal family: almost strongly uni-
versal [24, 25], almost xor-universal [21, 26], or almost
∆-universal family [27].
After consideration of many universal families of hash
functions, we have decided in favour of the Toeplitz hash-
ing (see Sec. III C above) due to its computational sim-
plicity. In the privacy amplification procedure, we exploit
that it is a 2-universal family. Here we exploit its xor-
universality [21]. Let the lengths of the authenticated
messages and their hash tags be lM and lh respectively.
The hash tag of the ith message Mi is calculated as
h(Mi) = TSMi ⊕ ri, (6)
where TS is a lh × lM Toeplitz matrix generated by a
string S of length lh + lM − 1, ri is a bit string of length
lh, and ⊕ is the bitwise xor. Both S and ri are private
and taken from the common private key Kaut. Then,
the probability that an eavesdropper will guess the hash
tag of a modified message is not more than 2−lh . The
demand εaut = 10
−12 gives lh = 40.
As in privacy amplification, we do not adopt a pseudo-
random generation of a string S from a shorter string.
This reduces the consumption rate of the private key.
However, formula (6) allows to generate the bit string S
only once, for the first message. For further messages, the
private key is consumed in the rate lh bits per message
4(for strings ri). Thus, large initial consumption of the
private is not critical. The string S may be used for
many sessions of quantum key distribution.
Also this consideration suggests that it is advantageous
to authenticate several messages at once: except for the
first message, the consumption of the private key is lh
bit per message and does not depend on the length of
the message. However, the reduction of the number of
authentications raises the risk of denial-of-service attacks
from an eavesdropper: he is able to simulate messages
from legitimate parties and force them to do calculations
before his interference will be disclosed (in the nearest
authentication stage). Thus, there is a trade-off between
the private key consumption rate and the risk of denial-
of-service attacks.
During the post-processing, the public classical chan-
nel is used twice: (i) to send the syndrome in the error
correction stage along with the verification hash tag and
(ii) to send the decision about possibility of key gener-
ation and (if the answer is positive) estimated level of
QBER and bit string used to generate the Toeplitz ma-
trix in the privacy amplification algorithm.
Another possibility is to use the hash function based
on the known GOST cipher [28], though it is not uncon-
ditionally secure.
V. WORKFLOW
The workflow of the post-processing procedure is as fol-
lows. Sifted keys go through the error correction that is
adjusted on the current value of QBER. After accumu-
lation of necessary number of blocks they input to the
parameter estimation (together with their versions be-
fore the error correction). If an estimated value of QBER
given by (3) is higher than the critical value needed for
efficient privacy amplification, the parties receive warn-
ing message about possible of eavesdropping. Otherwise,
verified blocks input privacy amplification and estimated
QBER is used in next round of the error correction algo-
rithm.
The overall (in)security parameter of the quantum key
distribution system is
εqkd = εver + εpa + εaut
= 2× 10−11 + 10−12 + 10−12 < 3× 10−11.
(7)
This parameter majorizes both the probability that the
keys of Alice and Bob do not coincide and the probability
of guessing the common key by Eve. If this parameter
exceeds a critical value, then the protocol is terminated.
After the privacy amplification procedure, a fraction of
the key is used for authentication in the next rounds. In
our setup, the fraction of generated private key consumed
by authentication procedure does not exceed 15%.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have present post-processing procedure for in-
dustrial quantum key distribution systems. The post-
processing procedure consisting of error correction, pa-
rameter estimation, and privacy amplification has been
described. Also authentication of classical communica-
tions over a public channel has been considered.
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